One Million Casualties Later: The War Putin Can’t Afford to Lose

I left Ukraine for the last time on January 1, 2024. At the time, I carried deep doubts about Kyiv’s ability to sustain the fight. I had seen the strain firsthand, having served alongside Ukrainian units, and I wondered how long the country could endure. Now, as the war stands on the threshold of 2026, my perspective has changed. Ukraine has not broken. It has adapted.

Russia’s 2025 summer push is running out of dry ground. Within weeks, eastern Ukraine will sink into rasputitsa, the season of mud that clogs farm tracks, floods trench lines, and turns every off-road move into a recovery operation. Historically, both armies slow their maneuvering until the steppe freezes solid by late December. Logistics grind down, and drones struggle in wind, rain, and low cloud. Moisture corrodes cheap electronics, visibility drops, and the cost of each kilometer gained increases. The war does not stop; it simply becomes heavier.

In earlier publications, I wrote that the outcome of Russia’s summer campaign would be measured by three settlements: Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Kupiansk. Each has become a gauge of the wider conflict, revealing not only Moscow’s capacity to attack but Ukraine’s endurance to hold.

Where Russia actually pushed and what still stands

Pokrovsk. The battle for Pokrovsk has dragged on since July 18, 2024, and the human cost continues to climb. What began as a modest push for a small industrial town has turned into one of the most violent demonstrations of Ukraine’s developing “drone defense in depth” strategy. Soldiers on the ground describe staggering Russian casualties, not as evidence of failed tactics but as proof of Moscow’s enduring readiness to trade men for meters.

Throughout 2025, Russian forces have pressed west along the Donetsk rail corridor, aiming to sever Ukrainian supply lines and isolate the logistics hub anchoring the sector. Yet Pokrovsk still holds. ISW reports from August through October confirm constant Russian assaults “in the Pokrovsk direction,” but no verified breakthroughs. In some areas, Ukrainian counterattacks have even regained ground.

A recent video circulated by analyst Preston Stewart showed a sizable Russian armored column advancing toward Pokrovsk, only to be destroyed in sequence by Ukrainian FPV drones. The footage underscores both Ukraine’s precision and Russia’s material strain. Analysts note a shortage of modern APCs across Russian formations, forcing units to convert tanks into improvised troop carriers clad in welded “turtle shells.” The tactic offers limited protection but reflects deeper logistical exhaustion within Russia’s armored reserves.

As Reuters reported earlier this year, the Kremlin’s operational goal remains the same: to cut off Pokrovsk and starve the defensive belt further west. For now, that ambition remains unrealized. The front endures as it has all year—a grinding contest of attrition, costly, unrelenting, and without decisive collapse.

(Source: https://deepstatemap.live/)

Kostiantynivka. Positioned south of the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk axis, Kostiantynivka remains a vital hinge in Ukraine’s eastern defense, securing the rail lines to Toretsk and the embattled city of Chasiv Yar. Russia partially controls Chasiv Yar following its 2023 capture of nearby Bakhmut, only about eleven kilometers away. Despite Moscow’s earlier claims of victory there, Ukrainian forces remain close enough to contest the area, a reminder of how limited Russia’s territorial gains have been given the scale of its losses.